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1. Introduction
The purpose for this article is to analyse factors that are related to the public’s punitiveness. Much of the dis-
cussion is based on data from an Estonian public poll, which makes it a novel contribution in several respects. 
With few exceptions*1  most studies on public punitiveness have thus far been conducted in Anglo-American 
countries where penal populism is a recognised phenomenon. In Estonia, the social environment is diﬀ erent 
and penal policy is rarely used to focus attention in election campaigns. At the same time, the importance of 
public opinion in penal policy formulation should not be underestimated. In the penal fi eld, public opinion 
primarily infl uences policy-making by calling for the adoption of legislation that is tough on crime and for 
allocation of further resources to law enforcement. In its milder forms of appearance, public opinion makes 
politicians averse to initiatives aimed at softening penal laws. Reactionist provisions that more often than 
not represent stop-gap solutions due to panic-provoking events (e.g., a murder case with extensive media 
coverage) are a good example of public opinion’s infl uence on penal policy-making. Needless to say, harsh 
punishments have not proved an eﬀ ective tool against crime, as harsh measures destabilise society*2.
For many years, Estonia has struggled with high incarceration rates*3 and has searched for avenues to 
bring the number of inmates down. Imprisonment rates have been shown to depend more on policy choices 
than on actual crime rates*4, which means that reduction of the number of prisoners has to be a deliberate 
policy choice, unlikely to be achieved as a side-eﬀ ect of the fi ght against crime. Changes in the legislation 
concerning parole release have allowed Estonia to reduce the number of prisoners by approximately 1,000 
ɲ E.g., J.C. Cochran, A.R. Piquero. Exploring sources of punitiveness among German citizens. – Crime & Delinquency ɶɸ 
(ɳɱɲɲ) / ɵ, pp. ɶɵɵ–ɶɸɲ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɱɱɲɲɲɳɹɸɲɲɵɱɶɱɱɳ; M.-L. Sööt. Trust and punitive attitudes. – 
Crime, Law & Social Change ɶɺ (ɳɱɲɴ), pp. ɶɴɸ–ɶɶɵ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɱɸ/sɲɱɷɲɲ-ɱɲɴ-ɺɵɳɸ-ɱ.
ɳ B. Bakken. China, a punitive society? – Asian Criminology ɷ (ɳɱɲɲ), pp. ɴɴ–ɶɱ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɱɸ/sɲɲɵɲɸ-
ɱɲɱ-ɺɱɹɷ-ɴ.
ɴ According to the International Centre of Prison Studies (ɳɱɲɷ), the country’s prisoner population is ɳɲɴ per ɲɱɱ,ɱɱɱ inhabi-
tants, one of Europe’s highest. See http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/estonia (most recently accessed on ɳɳ June ɳɱɲɸ).
ɵ P.K. Enns. The public’s increasing punitiveness and its infl uence on mass incarceration in the United States. – American 
Journal of Political Science ɶɹ (ɳɱɲɵ) / ɵ, pp. ɹɶɸ–ɹɸɳ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɲɲ/ajps.ɲɳɱɺɹ; T. Lappi-Seppälä. 
Trust, punitivity and imprisonment. Presentation at the Eurojustis conference Measuring Confi dence and Public Attitudes 
to Justice, held in Parma, Italy, in ɳɱɲɱ. 
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over fi ve years but now appear to have exhausted their potential. Other examples of steps that governments 
have taken to bring down the number of inmates include reducing the capacity of prisons and managing 
prison queues. Recourse to such mechanical and short-term measures actually signals a need for more 
permanent changes in penal policy (dealing with high re-oﬀ ending rates) as well as for a shift in people’s 
attitudes. One way of achieving this is to fi nd viable alternatives to imprisonment. However, most societies 
have yet to discover how to punish their oﬀ enders such that the punishment would satisfy the demands of 
various social groups and simultaneously reform the oﬀ ender’s ways. Existing sentencing options such as 
compulsory participation in social and treatment programmes, community work, fi nes, and reconciliation 
orders all represent alternatives to imprisonment yet fail to meet these two criteria fully. Moreover, scepti-
cism and too little information about alternative sentences have made it diﬃ  cult to rally public support for 
alternative ways of treating oﬀ enders*5. Lowering the number of inmates remains an unpopular policy that 
governments cannot easily explain to the electorate.
The other option for achieving a reduction of imprisonment rates is to change the attitudes held by the 
public. Some researchers believe that oﬀ ender-adverse public opinion is actually capable of leading to the 
imposition of tough sanctions*6, while others hold punitive publics to be a refl ection of public penal policy*7. 
Regardless of the mechanism actually at work, the European Social Survey (2010)*8 points to the Estonian 
population as being relatively punitively oriented. When people were asked which sentence they would 
impose on a 25-year-old house burglar, 64% of Estonians were in favour of imprisonment, making Esto-
nia ninth from the top on the list of the countries favouring imprisonment (the average preference rate was 
60%). The lowest preference for imprisonment was expressed in Finland (42%) and the highest in Ireland 
(73%). Irrespective of the criticism levelled against more public involvement in sentencing, recent years have 
witnessed appeals to increase it from the academic domain and seen a spate of corresponding policy initia-
tives – e.g., the introduction of lay assessors in courts*9. The growing involvement of the public in punishment 
decisions makes studying penal attitudes and the factors that infl uence them a more valuable task that holds 
potential for considerable practical application. Besides other results, such studies are likely to highlight the 
legitimacy level of the sentencing practices really employed –discrepancies between the sentences actually 
imposed and people’s understanding of proper punishment would suggest that practitioners of jurisprudence 
and policy-makers need to improve the communication and explanation of their decisions. Estonia has wit-
nessed a number of ‘pushmi-pullyu’ approaches from politicians whose penal policy is at best described as 
inconsistent and who appear to lack information about what their constituents actually desire. The declared 
goal for their penal  policy may be to reduce the number of prisoners, yet the decisions they make pave the way 
to construction of new mass-incarceration institutions and they preach condemnation and shaming as the 
purpose of  sentencing. 
This article analyses how public penal attitudes, and indirectly penal policy, can be shaped by social and 
political trust and the public’s perceptions about the aims of punishment. A trust in the society and its insti-
tutions could refl ect belief in the competency expressed in the institutions’ choices, while trust in strangers 
could serve as an indicator of belief in the rights of people to be equal members of society*10 and in people 
being capable of change*11. This could, furthermore, infl uence the way people perceive oﬀ enders (either as 
outcasts or as fellow members of society) and the choice as to their treatment (to impose either isolation 
or, on the contrary, more rehabilitative treatment)*12. There are several studies that have  examined the 
ɶ J.V. Roberts, M. Hough. Public attitudes to punishment: The context. – J.V. Roberts, M. Hough (eds). Changing Attitudes 
to Punishment: Public Opinion, Crime and Justice. London, New York: Routledge ɳɱɲɲ, pp. ɲ–ɲɵ.
ɷ P.K. Enns (see Note ɵ).
ɸ F.E. Zimring, D.T. Johnson. Public opinion and the governance of punishment in democratic political systems. – 
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science ɷɱɶ (ɳɱɱɷ), pp. ɳɷɷ–ɳɹɱ. – DOI: https://doi.
org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɱɱɱɳɸɲɷɳɱɶɳɹɶɺɵɺ.
ɹ European Social Survey (ɳɱɲɱ), Round ɶ. Available via http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/round-index.html (most 
recently accessed on ɸ June ɳɱɲɸ).
ɺ J.V. Roberts, J.W. Keijser. Democratising punishment: Sentencing, community views and values. – Punishment & Society 
ɲɷ (ɳɱɲɵ), pp. ɵɸɵ–ɵɺɹ. – DOI: ttps://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɲɵɷɳɵɸɵɶɲɵɶɴɺɶɴɺ.
ɲɱ J. Soss et al. Why do white Americans support the death penalty? – The Journal of Politics ɷɶ (ɳɱɱɴ) / ɳ, pp. ɴɺɸ–ɵɳɲ. – 
DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɲɲ/ɲɵɷɹ-ɳɶɱɹ.tɱɲ-ɳ-ɱɱɱɱɷ.
ɲɲ S. Maruna, A. King. Once a criminal, always a criminal?: ‘Redeemability’ and the psychology of punitive public attitudes. – 
European Journal of Criminal Policy Research ɲɶ (ɳɱɱɺ), pp. ɸ–ɳɵ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɱɸ/sɲɱɷɲɱ-ɱɱɹ-ɺɱɹɹ-ɲ.
ɲɳ V. Barker. The politics of pain: A political institutionalist analysis of crime victims’ moral protests. – Law & Society Review 
ɵɲ (ɳɱɱɸ) / ɴ, pp. ɷɲɺ–ɷɷɵ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɲɲ/j.ɲɶɵɱ-ɶɹɺɴ.ɳɱɱɸ.ɱɱɴɲɷ.x; M.T. Costelloe et al. The social 
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relationship between penal attitudes and various types of trust*13. Similarly, research has explored the links 
between the aims behind punishment and punitive attitudes*14. In this paper, we propose a single model to 
connect all these factors. 
2. The theory
2.1. Aims behind punishment
The most commonplace way of classifying the aims for punishment is by grouping them under the headings 
‘preventive (utilitarian)’ and ‘retributive (non-utilitarian)’. The point of punishment according to utilitar-
ians is to diminish future oﬀ ending; utilitarians believe also that punishment should be proportionate to 
the gravity of the crime. For them, punishment is, above all, a functional response. In contrast, non-utili-
tarians aim at achieving justice – for them, reforming the oﬀ ender is of secondary importance. According to 
non-utilitarians, each oﬀ ence deserves a reaction. While utilitarians look to the future, non-utilitarians are 
focused on the past and seek to bring about fairness*15.
Another way of understanding the aims for punishment is to distinguish between shaming and educa-
tive punishments. Shaming-oriented punishments as emotional responses to the acts of an oﬀ ender are 
triggered by talionic eye-for-an-eye attitudes*16. Such responses are derived from either sympathy for the 
victim or anger at the oﬀ ender*17. The principal idea with an educative punishment is to bring the oﬀ ender 
and the victim together in order for the oﬀ ender to better understand the consequences of his or her act. 
Shaming punishments are monologues by the state, while educative punishments promote dialogue, with 
the aim of repentance*18. 
Preference for a particular aim of punishment has to do with what people consider to be the causes of 
crime, which, in turn, is at least partially related to their worldview. Those who think that crime is a matter of 
personal choice favour justice-related punishment aims, while those who recognise that the causes of crime 
may have their roots in the oﬀ ender’s social setting are likely to prefer other goals. An earlier study showed 
that students who subscribed to labelling theory and structural positivism as explanations of crime tended 
to take a less punitive stance*19. In other words, those who believe that crime can be explained by societal 
inequalities rather than by personal choice would opt for milder approaches in the treatment of oﬀ enders*20. 
Earlier studies have found also that those for whom the aim of sentencing is to incarcerate the oﬀ ender 
are more punitive in their attitudes*21. Similarly, people who are more vengeful tend to support retribution 
and incapacitation as punishment’s aims*22. 
correlates of punitiveness toward criminals: A comparison of the Czech Republic and Florida. – Justice System Journal ɳɴ 
(ɳɱɱɳ) / ɳ, pp. ɲɺɲ–ɳɳɱ; J. Van Kesteren. Public attitudes and sentencing policies across the world. – European Journal of 
Criminal Policy Research ɲɶ (ɳɱɱɺ), pp. ɳɶ–ɵɷ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɱɸ/sɲɱɷɲɱ-ɱɱɺ-ɺɱɺɹ-ɸ.
ɲɴ M.-L. Sööt (see Note ɲ); M.T. Costelloe et al. (see Note ɲɳ); M.J. Hogan et al. Economic insecurity, blame, and punitive 
attitudes. – Justice Quarterly ɳɳ (ɳɱɱɸ) / ɴ, pp. ɴɺɳ–ɵɲɳ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɹɱ/ɱɸɵɲɹɹɳɱɶɱɱɳɲɺɲɵɵ.
ɲɵ E.g., I.R. McKee, N.T. Feather. Revenge, retribution, and values: Social attitudes and punitive sentencing. – Social Justice 
Research ɳɲ (ɳɱɱɹ), pp. ɲɴɹ–ɲɷɴ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɱɸ/sɲɲɳɲɲ-ɱɱɹ-ɱɱɷɷ-z; M.E. Oswald et al. Lay-perspectives 
on criminal deviance, goals of punishment, and punitivity. – Social Justice Research ɲɶ (ɳɱɱɳ) / ɳ, pp. ɹɶ–ɺɹ.
ɲɶ M.M. Plesničar. The individualization of punishment: Sentencing in Slovenia. – European Journal of Criminology ɲɱ (ɳɱɲɴ) 
/ ɵ, pp. ɵɷɳ–ɵɸɹ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɲɵɸɸɴɸɱɹɲɳɵɷɺɹɶɹ; R.S. Frase. Punishment purposes. – Stanford Law 
Review ɶɹ (ɳɱɱɶ) / ɲ, pp. ɷɸ–ɹɴ.
ɲɷ P.S. Garvey. Can shaming punishments educate? – The University of Chicago Law Review ɷɶ (ɲɺɺɹ) / ɴ, pp. ɸɴɴ–ɸɺɵ. – 
DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɳɴɱɸ/ɲɷɱɱɳɺɺ.
ɲɸ B.A. Gault, J. Sabini. The roles of empathy, anger, and gender in predicting attitudes toward punitive, reparative, and preventa-
tive public policies. – Cognition & Emotion ɲɵ (ɳɱɱɱ) / ɵ, pp. ɵɺɶ–ɶɳɱ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɹɱ/ɱɳɷɺɺɺɴɱɱɵɱɳɸɸɳ.
ɲɹ P.S. Garvey (see Note ɲɷ).
ɲɺ D.L. Falco, J.S. Martin. Examining punitiveness: Assessing views toward the punishment of oﬀ enders among criminology 
and non-criminology students. – Journal of Criminal Justice Education ɳɴ (ɳɱɲɳ) / ɳ, pp. ɳɱɶ–ɳɴɳ. – DOI: https://doi.
org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɹɱ/ɲɱɶɲɲɳɶɴ.ɳɱɲɲ.ɷɴɲɺɴɲ.
ɳɱ T.J. Hartnagel, L.J. Templeton. Emotions about crime and attitudes to punishment. – Punishment & Society ɲɵ (ɳɱɲɳ) / ɵ, 
pp. ɵɶɳ–ɵɸɵ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɲɵɷɳɵɸɵɶɲɳɵɶɳɶɲɺ.
ɳɲ M.E. Oswald et al. (see Note ɲɵ).
ɳɳ I.R. McKee, N.T. Feather (see Note ɲɵ).
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Clarity about the aims for sentencing is one of the core aspects of deciding on the sentence itself. 
R.S. Frase*23 argues that vague intuitions related to the objectives behind punishment tend to give way to 
personal beliefs, which in situations wherein the decision is up to a single judge creates a risk of fragmenta-
tion of sentencing practices. An insuﬃ  ciently clear understanding of the purpose for punishment is likely to 
distort the results, while a good sense of that purpose and of the type of punishment best suited to the case 
should reduce the subjective element in sentencing. 
2.2. Trust
In the social-sciences literature, a distinction is commonly made between two types of social trust, gener-
alised and specifi c*24. This article looks predominantly at generalised trust, a measure of confi dence that 
obtains among strangers. The complementary concept – specifi c trust – refers to trust among family mem-
bers and friends. Generalised trust is a notion that better refl ects people’s confi dence in anonymous mem-
bers of society, oﬀ enders among them. 
Generalised trust (trust in strangers) expresses people’s perceptions about society*25. Perceived group 
threat is one explanation for harsh, highly punitive attitudes – the dominant group protects its position, 
demonising the less fortunate by manipulating public opinion accordingly*26. Antipathy towards ‘the other’ 
and making the less fortunate into scapegoats are predictors of harsher, more punitive feelings*27. For the 
public, harsher punishments are a way of controlling a threatening group. It has been shown also that anger 
about and fear of crime evoke punitive feelings*28. When news media encourage personal identifi cation with 
the victims of crime, they thereby stoke anger against criminals, and tabloid-media consumption as the 
main source for one’s news appears to add to fears of crime and amplify punitive attitudes*29. People who 
are angry about crime are also people who feel less secure, and they therefore are likely to transform their 
anxiety into harsher punitive feelings*30. People who are trusting, on the other hand, tend to be more toler-
ant of fellow members of society*31. Trusting people believe in reforming the oﬀ ender. They are prepared 
to share a certain degree of responsibility for the oﬀ ender’s acts and wish to avoid the suﬀ ering that would 
be caused by harsh punishment, for they see the oﬀ ender as potentially valuable to their society*32. In high-
trust societies, the message of punishment to the oﬀ ender includes an invitation to co-operate*33. Moreover, 
high-trust societies are less concerned about crime*34. 
According to researchers, political trust, measured as confi dence in the various political institutions 
(political parties, the government, the police force, etc.), is a strong predictor of social trust, which suggests 
ɳɴ R.S. Frase (see Note ɲɶ).
ɳɵ E. Uslaner. The moral foundations of trust. ɳɱɱɴ. Available at http://gvptsites.umd.edu/uslaner/uslanermoralfoundations.
pdf (most recently accessed on ɳɳ June ɳɱɲɸ).
ɳɶ K. Newton. Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. – International Political Science Review ɳɳ (ɳɱɱɲ) / ɳ, 
pp. ɳɱɲ–ɳɲɵ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɱɲɺɳɶɲɳɲɱɲɳɳɳɱɱɵ.
ɳɷ D. Wheelock et al. Perceived group threat and punitive attitudes in Russia and the United States. – British Journal of Crimi-
nology ɶɲ (ɳɱɲɲ), pp. ɺɴɸ–ɺɶɺ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/bjc/azrɱɶɴ.
ɳɸ M.T. Costelloe et al. (see Note ɲɳ); M.J. Hogan et al. (see Note ɲɴ).
ɳɹ D. Johnson. Anger about crime and support for punitive criminal justice policies. – Punishment & Society ɲɲ (ɳɱɱɺ), 
pp. ɶɲ–ɷɷ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɲɵɷɳɵɸɵɶɱɹɱɺɹɲɴɳ.
ɳɺ K. Demker et al. Fear and punishment in Sweden: Exploring penal attitudes. – Punishment & Society ɲɱ (ɳɱɱɹ), pp. ɴɲɺ–ɴɴɳ. – 
DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɲɵɷɳɵɸɵɶɱɹɱɺɱɳɳɹ; K. Dowler. Media consumption and public attitudes toward crime and 
justice: The relationship between fear of crime, punitive attitudes, and perceived police eﬀ ectiveness. – Journal of Criminal 
Justice and Popular Culture ɲɱ (ɳɱɱɴ) / ɳ, pp. ɲɱɺ–ɲɳɷ.
ɴɱ D. Johnson (see Note ɳɹ).
ɴɲ E. Uslaner (see Note ɳɵ).
ɴɳ S. Maruna, A. King (see Note ɲɲ); T.R. Tyler, R.J. Boeckmann. Three strikes and you are out, but why? The psychology of 
public support for punishing rule breakers. – Law and Society Review ɴɲ (ɲɺɺɸ) / ɳ, pp. ɳɴɸ–ɳɷɷ. – DOI: https://doi.
org/ɲɱ.ɳɴɱɸ/ɴɱɶɴɺɳɷ; M.T. Costelloe et al. (see Note ɲɳ); D. Johnson (see Note ɳɹ); V. Barker (see Note ɲɳ); J. Van Kesteren 
(see Note ɲɳ); J. Soss et al. (see Note ɲɱ).
ɴɴ D. Baillet, P.A.M. Van Lange. Trust, punishment, and cooperation across ɲɹ societies: A meta-analysis. – Perspectives on 
Psychological Science ɹ (ɳɱɲɴ) / ɵ, pp. ɴɷɴ–ɴɸɺ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɲɸɵɶɷɺɲɷɲɴɵɹɹɶɴɴ.
ɴɵ R. Wike. Where trust is high, crime and corruption are low. Pew Research Center, ɳɱɱɹ. Available at http://www.pewglobal.
org/ɳɱɱɹ/ɱɵ/ɲɶ/where-trust-is-high-crime-and-corruption-are-low/ (most recently accessed on ɲɱ April ɳɱɲɶ).
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that to a certain extent social trust is a product of political trust*35 – a conclusion contested by other authors*36. 
In comparison to social trust, political trust is impersonal and mediated. This means that the origins of social 
trust lie in personal connec tions, while political trust is shaped by news media and other mediated sources. 
Political trust is related to one’s belief in open government, and its measure depends on how well the political 
system works*37. People who do not trust politicians tend to be unhappy with the outcomes of their policies, 
including those intended to counter the perceived threat of crime. When people feel that crime is a problem 
they are more likely not to trust the government*38 and to believe that the government’s response to the crime 
problem is inadequate. Crime salience and crime-specifi c concerns (e.g., worries about drug traﬃ  cking) have 
been found to predict punitiveness in attitudes at the level of the individual*39. It has been argued that a 
decline in political trust is, in fact, behind the rise in imprisonment rates in the US*40. 
3. Data and methods
The data used in our analysis were obtained from a poll commissioned by the Estonian Ministry of Justice 
and conducted by Turu-uuringute AS in Estonia in January 2014 through a regular omnibus survey. The 
method used was simple completion of a questionnaire via face-to-face interviews, and the response rate 
was 27%. The sample consisted of 500 respondents over 15 years of age who were representative of the 
Estonian general population: The sample consisted of 42% men and 58% women, with 53% representing 
the 15–49 age band and 47% being 50 or older. As for education level, 16% had had an elementary or pri-
mary education, 58% had a secondary or vocational education, and 26% had received at least some higher 
education.
3.1. The variables
3.1.1. Length of sentences / severity of punishment
In many studies, punitiveness is measured as a complex index composed via multiple statements (that there 
should be a universal increase in the severity of sentences, that oﬀ enders should be harshly punished, etc.), 
for which respondents are invited to express their degree of support*41. Another technique that is sometimes 
used involves having respondents choose between individual sentencing options, such as imprisonment vs. 
community service. This method is used by, amongst others, those administering the European Victimisa-
tion Survey*42. Our study, following the example of Swiss researchers*43, uses length of imprisonment as the 
measure of the severity of punishment. In addition to supporting simplicity, this technique aids in overcom-
ing the complexity problem – i.e., the issue of the particular meaning that respondents attribute to certain 
types of punishment. The length of imprisonment as a measurement continuum is more apt to describe 
what people consider a severe punishment compared to choosing between diﬀ erent types of punishment. 
For example, although it is widely assumed that imprisonment is the harshest form of punishment (since it 
includes severe limitations on personal freedoms), researchers do not know which of the options presented 
is actually considered more/most severe by a particular respondent. After all, the myth of Sisyphus has it, 
the toughest punishment of all consists in being compelled to do work that serves no purpose.
ɴɶ M. Freitag. Social capital in (dis)similar democracies: The development of generalized trust in Japan and Switzerland. – 
Comparative Political Studies ɴɷ (ɳɱɱɴ) / ɹ, pp. ɺɴɷ–ɺɷɷ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɱɱɲɱɵɲɵɱɱɴɳɶɷɲɲɷ.
ɴɷ See K. Newton (see Note ɳɶ).
ɴɸ Ibid.
ɴɹ J. Upton, C. Mansell. Building cohesion and trust in London – a social marketing approach. – International Review on 
Public and Non-Profi t Marketing ɹ (ɳɱɲɲ), pp. ɶɸ–ɸɲ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɱɸ/sɲɳɳɱɹ-ɱɲɱ-ɱɱɷɳ-ɶ.
ɴɺ C.A. Spiranovic et al. What predicts punitiveness? An examination of predictors of punitive attitudes towards oﬀ enders in 
Australia. – Psychiatry, Psychology and Law ɲɺ (ɳɱɲɳ) / ɳ, pp. ɳɵɺ–ɳɷɲ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɹɱ/ɲɴɳɲɹɸɲɺ.ɳɱɲ
ɲ.ɶɷɲɸɷɷ; T.J. Hartnagel, L.J. Templeton (see Note ɳɱ).
ɵɱ F.E. Zimring, D.T. Johnson (see Note ɸ).
ɵɲ D.L. Falco, J.S. Martin (see Note ɲɺ); C.A. Spiranovic et al. (see Note ɵɱ); M.T. Costelloe et al. (see Note ɲɳ).
ɵɳ J. Van Kesteren (see Note ɲɳ).
ɵɴ A. Kuhn, J. Vuille. Are judges too lenient according to public opinion? – Criminology ɳɱɲɲ/October, pp. ɸɶ–ɹɱ.
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The questionnaire consisted of four vignettes, each containing a description of an oﬀ ence and back-
ground information about the oﬀ ender. The types of oﬀ ences in these vignettes were domestic violence, 
embezzlement from a bank, violent robbery of a shop, and burglary by a repeat oﬀ ender. For each scenario, 
the respondent was invited to answer a series of questions, about the type of sentence that would, in his or 
her view, be appropriate in the case at hand and – in the question that elicited the data for this paper – the 
length of the prison sentence that he or she would impose (as a number of days/weeks/months/years) in 
a situation in which imprisonment is the only option (without suspension of any portion of the sentence). 
Described in brief, the domestic-violence scenario involved a married couple whose quarrel, caused by 
jealousy, led to violent confl ict, with the female needing medical help because of bruises and aching ribs. 
The embezzlement case involved a clerk who embezzled 360,000 euros in the course of fi ve years. In the 
vignette presenting violent robbery of a shop, the robber threatened a saleswoman with a knife and made oﬀ  
with, in total, 2,200 euros. Finally, the burglary scenario involved intrusion to the cellars of a block of fl ats 
and causing 6,500 euros in damage. All of the perpetrators except the burglar, who was a repeat criminal, 
were fi rst-time oﬀ enders. Also, apart from the bank employee, all the oﬀ enders were either drug or alcohol 
addicts. Some additional background details on the oﬀ enders were provided to the respondents, such as 
age, childhood circumstances, education, and/or employment status.
Of the four scenarios, the one attracting the most severe sanctions was that of the repeat burglar: the ave-
rage imprisonment the respondents chose to impose here was 51.3 months (4.2 years). The shortest prison 
term was imposed for the domestic-violence oﬀ ender (14.4 months, or 1.2 years). One of the reasons the 
burglar tended to be assigned the most severe punishment might be his prior convictions (according to the 
case write-up, he had already had eight convictions), while the other scenarios involved fi rst-time oﬀ ences.
Figure 1. Average length of imprisonment imposed (in months) 
For every scenario, the distribution of the prison sentence imposed was positively skewed. For primarily 
this reason, we decided to forgo analysis of average sentence lengths and to focus our further analysis on 
the most extreme sentences. In the fi rst step, we separated the respondents who preferred harsh sentences 
from those who favoured milder ones: considering the length of the sentences, for each oﬀ ence we classifi ed 
the responses in the band of approximately 10% that represented opting for the longest terms of imprison-
ment as extremely punitive. In the case of the domestic-violence oﬀ ender, the preferred term of imprison-
ment within this decile was 36 months or longer (accounting for 9.5% of the respondents); for the cases of 
embezzling and violent robbery, it was 60 months or longer (a sentence assigned by 15.8% and 16.5% of 
the respondents, respectively); and for the repeat burglar, it was 120 months or more (10.9% of the respon-
dents). In total, 37% of respondents selected an extremely long sentence (i.e., one in the top decile) in at 
least one of the cases.
As the next step, we compiled a new composite index, according to which those who did not belong 
to the extremely punitive group for any of the oﬀ ences were denoted with ‘0’, while those whose response 
qualifi ed as extremely punitive in one case received the indicator ‘1’ and those who represented the top 
decile in two or more cases were designated as group 2. Respondents who gave no answer for at least one of 
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the questions were omitted from the analyses. The distribution of the extreme sentences by percentage and 
absolute number is shown in Table 1. 
Choosing only extreme answers better refl ects opinions of those people who are consistently more puni-
tive-minded in more than just one scenario. Those who were less punitive in their attitudes, as refl ected in 
not choosing such a value for more than one scenario, were used as a comparison category. This facilitated 
analysis by enabling us to describe punitively minded persons relative to the rest.  
Table 1: The proportion of extreme sentences
Frequency Percentage
0 313 62.5
1 108 21.7
2 (≥ extreme choices) 67 13.4
Total 488 97.6
Data missing 12 2.4
3.1.2. Aims behind the sentencing
The respondents were given a list of general aims pursued via sentencing (not related to the scenarios 
above) and instructed to evaluate the importance of each on a four-point scale (with ‘1’ meaning ‘not impor-
tant at all’ and 4 meaning ‘very important’).
Punishing the oﬀ ender and reacting to the oﬀ ence were seen as the most important aim (considered 
‘very important’ and ‘important’ by 96% of respondents) together with compensating the victim (also 96%), 
while reconciliation between the parties to the oﬀ ence was regarded as the least important (69%). In prin-
ciple, respondents saw aims that are quite diﬀ erent and even contradictory as equally important – a fi nding 
that is consistent with the results of earlier studies*44. The results from our study are supported by previ-
ous studies also in that respondents elsewhere too appear to prefer punishment of the particular oﬀ ender 
responsible and the prevention of further oﬀ ences over rehabilitation of the oﬀ ender*45. The modest sup-
port displayed for the goals of restorative justice, reconciliation among them, might be due to a lack of 
information about the principles and impact of restorative justice. 
Figure 2. For various aims behind sentencing, the percentage of respondents 
who considered each aim either important or very important.
ɵɵ R.S. Frase (see Note ɲɶ).. J. Doble. Attitudes to punishment in the US – punitive and liberal opinions. – J.V. Roberts, M. Hough 
(eds). Changing Attitudes to Punishment. Public Opinion, Crime and Justice. London, New York: Routledge ɳɱɲɲ, p. ɲɷɴ.
ɵɶ Ibid., pp. ɲɶɱ–ɲɶɳ.
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To understand whether certain aims of sentencing could be considered in combination, we performed a 
principal component analysis. This analysis showed that there were three aims that were strongly correlated 
with each other as compared to the rest: to isolate the oﬀ ender and protect society, to serve as a warning 
to others, and to express society’s condemnation of the act (see Table 2, below). This component clearly 
distinguishes a group of people for whom societally oriented aims of punishment are important. Societal 
aims revolve around the protection of society, while the others (i.e., individual- and victim-related goals) 
have to do with targeting the particular oﬀ ender, along with his or her behaviour, or the victim. Because of 
their justice-seeking aspect, societal aims are linked mainly with non-utilitarian punish ments. For making 
the best use of the information about correlations between distinct items under ‘aims of sentencing’ and to 
prevent multicollinearity eﬀ ects, the component ‘societal aims of sentencing’ yielded by the principal com-
ponent analysis was utilised in further analysis.
Table 2: Results from principal component analysis (the component explains 
53% of the original variables)
Component loadings Communalities
To isolate the oﬀ ender and protect society 0.78 0.42
To serve as a warning to others 0.76 0.61
To express society’s condemnation of the act 0.65 0.57
3.1.3. Social (generalised) trust
On a four-point Likert scale, where ‘1’ represented ‘very trustworthy’ and ‘4’ ‘untrustworthy’, 62% of the 
respondents considered most people in Estonia to be very trustworthy or somewhat trustworthy (‘1’ or ‘2’, 
respectively), while 34% considered them either not very trustworthy or untrustworthy. The 4% who did not 
respond were excluded from further analysis.
3.1.4. Political trust
In the opinion polls and questionnaires used in studies that investigate ‘political trust’, this term may refer 
to confi dence in political parties, the government, the parliament, or politicians*46. Trust in parties and in 
politicians appear to refl ect very similar attitudes. According to the European Social Survey 2012*47, the 
level of trust in political parties was almost identical to that in politicians in Estonia – politicians were con-
sidered untrustworthy by 14.8% of respondents and political parties by 14.6%, while 0.6% of respondents 
indicated that they completely trust politicians and 0.4% expressed the same attitude vis-à-vis political par-
ties. Trust in the parliament was slightly higher, the corresponding fi gures being 11.6% and 1.4%. Political 
trust in our study means belief in politicians and was measured by means of the 4-point Likert scale, where 
‘1’ signifi ed ‘complete belief that the Estonian politicians are doing their best for the country’ and ‘4’ denoted 
total disbelief in that proposition. According to the results, 33% expressed ‘complete belief...’ or tended to 
believe in (trust) politicians, while 60% tended not to believe in them or had no belief (trust) in them. Seven 
per cent did not respond and hence were excluded from further analysis.
3.2. The results
To analyse the various factors contributing to the selection of an extreme sentence, we used multi nomial logistic 
regression models (see Table 3). The choice of logistic regression over a linear model was based on data-related 
requirements: a linear model would not have been optimal in light of the data’s skewness with respect to the 
lengths of sentences. The dependent variable was the number of extreme sentences on the scale 0 to 2. We 
ɵɷ M. Freitag (see Note ɴɶ); K. Newton (see Note ɳɶ).
ɵɸ European Social Survey (ɳɱɲɳ), Round ɷ. Available via http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/round-index.html (most 
recently accessed on ɲɵ April ɳɱɲɶ).
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composed models to compare the likeli hood of a respondent meting out one extreme sentence to that of him or 
her not choosing any extreme punishments and to compare the chances of handing out two or more extreme 
sentences to those of giving none. The independent variables were the aims for sentencing, political trust, and 
social trust. In addition, we used socio-demographic control variables: age, gender, ethnicity (Estonian vs. 
non-Estonian, as 2/3 of the Estonian population are Estonians while most of the rest are Russian, followed by 
smaller groups of Ukrainians and others), and education.  
Table 3: Odds ratios from the logistic regression model for extreme sentences 
(reference category: no extreme sentences)
1 extreme 
sentence
2 or more ex treme 
sentences
Aim behind sentencing: protection of society 0.98 2.00**
Social trust: belief that people are very or some-
what trustworthy
0.44** 0.43**
Political trust: full belief or tendency to believe 
that politicians are doing their best for the country 
0.52* 0.47*
Gender: male 1.36 2.26*
Ethnicity: non-Estonian 1.42 1.06
Education1: primary or less 0.86 0.19**
Education: secondary 1.12 0.78
Education: vocational 0.87 0.50
Age 1.00 1.03**
Constant -0.37 -2.29
N 436
Nagelkerke R² 0.192
Model chi-squared 76.2***
* p<0.05; **p<0.01
1 The reference category for level of education is at least some higher education.
We discovered that high social and high political trust both reduce the risk of imposing extreme sentences on 
oﬀ enders. In other words, trusting individuals are milder towards oﬀ enders. Looking at the aims of punish-
ment, one can see that those who prefer emphasis on broad societal aims tend to be more punitive. However, 
the eﬀ ect was statistically signifi cant only in the case of two or more extreme sentences; i.e., it mattered only 
when respondents were systematically punitive and selected an extremely long imprisonment term in two or 
more cases. In the case of systematic punitiveness, the fi ndings support earlier research suggesting that men 
are more punitive*48. Surprisingly, in a contrast to fi ndings from some earlier studies*49, people with lower 
education levels appeared to be somewhat less punitive in our study. This could be explained by social aﬃ  lia-
tion – people belonging to the same social class are likely to experience group solidarity, and, since oﬀ enders 
usually have a modest education, those with lower educational qualifi cations would tend to be more tolerant 
towards oﬀ enders. It is appropriate to point out in this connection that, of the four vignettes presented in 
the questionnaire, three involved ‘ordinary’ (less-educated) criminals. A study conducted earlier in Estonia 
lends support to the solidarity hypothesis, under which people with a lower income would be expected to 
prefer community-service sentences over imprisonment*50. Another fi nding was that age had a positive eﬀ ect 
on the severity of punishment – older people preferred harsher sentences, a fi nding consistent with those of 
some earlier research*51. Ethnicity did not have an eﬀ ect on the dependent variable.
ɵɹ B. Kutaledze, A.M. Crossman. An exploratory analysis of gender diﬀ erences in punitiveness in two countries. – International 
Criminal Justice Review ɲɺ (ɳɱɱɺ), pp. ɴɳɳ–ɴɵɴ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɲɱɶɸɶɷɸɸɱɺɴɴɹɺɳɲ; J. Van Kesteren 
(see Note ɲɳ); K. Dowler (see Note ɳɺ); B.A. Gault, J. Sabini (see Note ɲɸ).
ɵɺ J.D. Unnever, F.T. Cullen. The social sources of Americans’ punitiveness: A test of three competing models. – Criminology 
ɵɹ (ɳɱɲɱ) / ɲ, pp. ɺɺ–ɲɳɺ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɲɲ/j.ɲɸɵɶ-ɺɲɳɶ.ɳɱɲɱ.ɱɱɲɹɲ.x; B. Kutaledze, A.M. Crossman (see 
Note ɵɺ); J. Van Kesteren (see Note ɲɳ); S. Maruna, A. King (see Note ɲɲ).
ɶɱ M.-L. Sööt (see Note ɲ).
ɶɲ C.D. Bader et al. Divine justice: The relationship between images of God and attitudes toward criminal punishment. – Criminal 
Justice Review ɴɶ (ɳɱɲɱ) / ɲ, pp. ɺɱ–ɲɱɷ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɲɸɸ/ɱɸɴɵɱɲɷɹɱɺɴɷɱɴɳɺ; C. Fortete, J.D. Cesano. 
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4. Discussion and conclusions
The study demonstrates that social and political trust are good predictors with respect to punitive attitudes. 
People who do not trust strangers and are sceptical of politicians would impose longer sentences on oﬀ end-
ers. The relationship between trust and punitiveness applies for incidental as well as systematic punitive-
ness – whether or not the respondent chose an extremely severe sentence for only one of the oﬀ enders 
(expressing incidental punitiveness) or imposed a harsh sentence on two or more oﬀ enders (expressing 
systematic punitiveness), the degree of trust that he or she had in strangers or in politicians would still 
largely determine the level of punitiveness. In addition, our study shows that one’s notions of the aims 
behind punishment are a strong predictor with regard to systematically severe, highly punitive approaches. 
Those for whom the central aim with punishment is the protection of society are more punitive. That is, 
people for whom the main aims for sentencing involve isolating the oﬀ ender, condemning him or her, and 
deterring other would-be oﬀ enders are more punitive than those who do not consider these aims to be of 
central importance.
The relative mildness of the sentences handed out by those who trust strangers is explained by their 
greater tolerance of and belief in other members of society. Trusting individuals are less apprehensive about 
outgroups and are, therefore, likely to be less punitive. Also, people who have faith in other members of 
society believe themselves not to be deliberately denied access to societal resources and hence do not see 
a need to defend themselves against ‘others’. This stands in contrast to the concerns of those who feel that 
society (which they defi ne narrowly, excluding those groups perceived as ‘other’) needs protection and who 
consequently express more punitiveness. Trusting people are more open towards others, while those who 
lack trust would rather exclude groups who are perceived as inherently diﬀ erent. 
The less punitive attitudes of those who have trust in politicians are explained by their confi dence in the 
government’s actions in the fi ght against crime. The variable expresses people’s belief that politicians act 
in the best interests of their country. Individuals who are trusting are less suspicious of government policy 
and its real-world ability to curb crime, and they are, accordingly, not prone to experience intense emotions 
with regard to crime. This makes them less punitive. 
Thus, a narrow understanding of the aims behind punishment paves the way to experiencing pro-
nounced punitive feelings. In other words, punishment being seen as for condemnation, waving a warning 
fi nger at would-be criminals, and isolation (that is, it being seen as applied to protect society) results in 
harsher, more punitive attitudes. Isolation makes further oﬀ ences against members of society impossible; 
i.e., the longer the imprisonment, the more long-lasting the protection. Condemnation expresses the pub-
lic’s disapproval of the act of committing the oﬀ ence; this refl ects strong punitiveness and an eye-for-an-eye 
approach. Disapproval is an emotional assessment that feeds in to the vicious circle of punitiveness, since 
emotions have been shown to trigger harsher punitive feelings. Warning other potential oﬀ enders is a 
moralistic wagging of the fi nger at would-be criminals that is likely to have little eﬀ ect (the eﬀ ectiveness of 
general deterrence depends on various factors, such as the likelihood of getting caught, the target group’s 
eventual addictions, and mental condition)*52. 
The fi ndings presented above suggest several important conclusions. In an environment of high social 
and political trust, it is easier to reduce the public’s punitiveness. Consequently it will be easier to fi nd sup-
port for policies aimed at more individualised and therefore less harsh penal laws as opposed to ‘one-size 
fi ts all’ punishments where minimum punishment levels outweigh individual characteristics and needs of 
oﬀ enders. The latter can be achieved without controversy only when the corresponding measures are sup-
ported by public opinion – i.e., in a climate of enlightened penal attitudes. Any long-term reduction in 
the number of prisoners must come through a deliberate policy choice; it is unlikely to be achieved as an 
 incidental side eﬀ ect of crime-reduction. 
On the practical side, besides measures directly targeted at reducing prisoner numbers, the focus of 
incarceration-rate reduction programmes should be on shifting the opinions of systematically punitive 
social groups, whose views about the aims behind punishment may warp public opinion and, in so doing, 
have a negative impact on the fulfi lment of those programmes’ aims. Swiss researchers*53 demonstrated 
Punitive attitudes in Latin America. – European Journal of Criminal Policy Research ɲɶ (ɳɱɱɺ), pp. ɲɳɲ–ɲɴɷ. – DOI: 
https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɱɸ/sɲɱɷɲɱ-ɱɱɹ-ɺɱɺɴ-ɵ.
ɶɳ R.S. Frase (see Note ɲɶ).
ɶɴ A. Kuhn, J. Vuille (see Note ɵɵ).
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that it is not the general public who hold abnormally punitive attitudes but, rather, a certain part of the 
population. Only a small percentage of the population (in the case of the study reported upon here, about 
13% of the respondents) are systematically punitive, yet their voices often drown out milder and more rea-
sonable opinions, thereby giving politicians an incentive to shoot down policies that would bring imprison-
ment rates down. Educating this group through explaining the aims of punishment and their relationship to 
various types of sentences is a way of overcoming systematic punitiveness, and it appears to be a good start 
for shaping a social environment that is conducive to introducing individualised penalties and reducing the 
number of prisoners. Other important ways of preparing the ground for a downward shift in incarceration 
rates include fostering social ties between people and enacting policies that support and intensify social 
involvement – all measures strengthening social trust*54. 
ɶɵ J.L. Glanville et al. Do social connections create trust? An examination using new longitudinal data. – Social Forces ɺɳ (ɳɱɲɴ) 
/ ɳ, pp. ɶɵɶ–ɶɷɳ. – DOI: https://doi.org/ɲɱ.ɲɱɺɴ/sf/sotɱɸɺ.
